• 作者： 張慈佳
• 作者服務機構： 政治大學地政學系
• 中文摘要： This paper extends the political business cycle theories by concerning the capability of incumbent's electoral manipulation on local economy. Using a panel data from 1985 to 1997 on counties and cities in Taiwan, we find strong evidence to support the notion that the capability of incumbent's electoral manipulation has a positive relationship to political business cycles. On the other hand, the empirical results of Schultz's (1995) argument that the electoral manipulation has a political cost, and of the notion that Clark et al. (1998) addressed that the institutional constraints affect the occurrence of political business cycles seem ambiguous here. However, the coefficient on the dummy variable of electoral cycles in the regression analysis of land tax is not correctly signed. Two factors can be illustrated for the pre-electoral increment of land tax. One is the land price increases induced by the advanced amenities out of the local government's pre-electoral expansionary policies. The other is the pre-electoral increment of land use conversion, as shown in this paper that electoral cycles are applicable in the land use conversion which the local government may use as an instrument of electoral manipulation.
• 英文摘要： 本文將政治景氣循環理論延伸至地方層級，期能藉此了解選舉與地方經濟之間的關係，以彌補相關文獻僅考量政治層面的不足。此外，為拓展政治景氣循環理論，本文提出「執政者操控經濟之能力」與政治景氣循環現象之間的關係，試圖為過去分歧的實證結果提出另一個思考方向。本文進一步以台灣地區民國七十四年至八十六年的相關資料進行實證研究，由結果可知，地方政府之執政者於選前以增加「平均每人歲出」，以及「每年新闢與維護之道路面積」等擴張政策為工具，進行地方經濟之操控，藉以達成其連任的目的。而若進一步考量Shults (1995)之「政治成本」，與Clark et al.,（1998）之「制度限制」等對於政治景氣循環現象的影響，則實證結果並不一致。至於本文所推論之「執政者操控經濟之能力」對於政治景氣循環現象的影響，則在兩個實證結果中均獲得證實。另外，在理論上地方政府可利用的另一項工具—減稅方面，若同時考量「政治成本」，或是同時考量「執政者操控能力」，則選舉與「地價稅收」之間呈現顯著的相關，惟其符號與預期相反，即地價稅收於選前有增加的趨勢。對於此一有別於預期的結果，本文提出兩點解釋：一是地方政府的選前擴張政策帶動地方寧適條件提高，而導致地價水準提高所致；二是因土地使用變更數量亦呈現選舉循環之故，故「土地使用變更」亦可能是另一項地方政府操控經濟以獲取選票的工具。
• 中文關鍵字： political business cycle; the capability of incumbent's electoral manipulation; political cost; institutional constraint; County Magistrates and City Mayors Election
• 英文關鍵字： 政治景氣循環；執政者操控經濟之能力；政治成本；制度限制；縣市長選舉