- 作者: 曾美君
- 作者服務機構: 國立中山大學企業管理學系
- 中文摘要: Previous research indicates that privatization may not lead to a welfare improvement. A mixed duopoly model, in which firms compete in Cournot fashion or the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader in setting output, is presented to examine the welfare effects of privatization in the presence of strategic managerial incentives. It is shown that even though privatization may not be welfare-improving, the possibility is lower when strategic managerial incentives are taken into account. In addition, the question of how to motivate the private firm's managers is discussed.
- 英文摘要: 回顧文獻,民營化不一定可以改善社會福利。本研究加入考量民營廠商可能針對其經理人的誘因,進行策略性管理的可能性,重新檢視民營化對社會福利的影響。我們利用混合雙占模型,以兩家廠商進行Cournot 競爭或以公營廠商為領導者的Stackelberg競爭的不同情境,來分析民營化的福利效果。研究發現,民營化雖然不見得可以改善社會福利,但當民營廠商可能針對其經理人的誘因進行策略性考量時,民營化對社會福利沒有助益的可能性變小。同時,本研究也引伸出民營廠商在與公營廠商競爭時,應激勵其經理人全力追求市場占有率的管理意涵。
- 中文關鍵字: privatization, strategic managerial incentives, welfare analysis
- 英文關鍵字: 民營化,策略性管理誘因,社會福利分析