• 作者： 蕭代基
• 作者服務機構： 中央研究院經濟研究所
• 中文摘要： 環境污染的外部效果具有公共性、影響人數很多、及造成損害過程較長等特性，本文比較庇古稅制與無過失責任制等二種規範環境污染的制度之效率性。本文發現，在確定性之情況下，庇古稅制多較無過失責任制具有效率，但亦會扭曲廠商長期進出市場之誘因，惟有當承受者毫無防治（減輕）損害之能力時，無過失責任制亦具效率；在不確定性之情況下，惟有當污染者較政府擁有較多且正確的污染損害資訊，承受者無防治（減輕）損害之能力，且兩制度之執行機率相同時，無過失責任制較具有效率，否則，庇古稅制較無過失責任制具有效率。
• 英文摘要： This paper compares the two approaches which are used to regulate environmental pollution externalities bas-ed solely on the criterium of efficiency. These two approaches are Pigouvian taxation and strict liability. Theexternalities generated by environmental pollution are usually public in nature and it takes a long and complicatedprocess for them to affect a lot of people. There are two cases. First, in the case of certainty, Pigouvian taxationis usually more efficient than strict liability. Only when recipients are unable to mitigate environmental pollutiondamages are these two systems the same in terms of efficiency, since the full compensation by polluters under strictliability will reduce the recipients’incentives to mitigate damages and increase the total resources devoted by bothto reduce the damages. On the one hand, in the case of uncertainties, only when polluters are more likely to possessinformation about the prospect or the occurrence of pollution damages, when recipients are unable to mitigatedamages, and when the two approaches have the same likelihood to enforce the taxation or penalty upon the in-jurers, then the efficiency of the two approaches are the same. Otherwise, the Pigouvian taxation is more efficient.
• 中文關鍵字： 環境污染; 庇古枕制; 無過失責任
• 英文關鍵字： --