- 作者: Bor-Yann Chen
- 中文摘要: --
- 英文摘要: Based on the Nash equilibrium evolving in an extensive-form, not a normal-form game, it is found that virulence reduction of and skill improvement of E. coli is a reasonable outcome of direct temperature induction of bacteriophage Q–-mutant in Escherichia coli. This cooperative situation evolved as the Nash equilibrium is basically considered as a long-term sustainable development strategy for species coexistence. A host demands a -free environment by skill improvement for normal growth. Meanwhile, chooses a less virulent strategy to maintain host viability for the sake of its survival. Virulence reduction of enhances the coexistence of and E. coli; thus, moderate induction results. This strategic game obviously clarifies certain hypothesized results shown in previous works.
- 中文關鍵字: --
- 英文關鍵字: --