• 作者： 丁碧慧；吳壽山；吳欽杉
• 作者服務機構： *Institute of Business Management National Sun Yat-Sen University Kaohsiung, Taiwan, R. O. C. **Institute of Business and Management National Chiao Tung University Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C
• 中文摘要： Under the present fixed-rate deposit insurance scheme, this paper derives the optimal closure/reorganization policies for a pure cost-minimizing regulator and a welfare-maximizing regulator. We show that the threshold assets-todeposits ratio, below which a bank should be optimally closed, is bank-specific and depends on the objective of regulator. When the regulator seeks to minimize reorganization cost, the threshold assets-to-deposits ratio is greater than one and is increasing in the bank's risk on investment. In addition, raising the deposit insurance premium has an ambiguous effect on the threshold level. However, for a welfare-maximizing regulator, the threshold level is shown to be decreasing in the bank's risk on investment and marginal benefit of audit cost, and to be increasing in the current deposit insurance premium. Moreover, if the current deposit insurance premium is less than the threshold deposit insurance premium that is increasing in marginal benefit of audit cost, the threshold level will be less than one.
• 英文摘要： 本文分別就管制者追求成本極小化及社會福利極大化兩種情況，探討現行固定存款保險 費率制下之最適銀行重組策略。本文分析結果顯示：管制者應在銀行的資產對存款負債比率低於一臨界值時，關閉銀行；且此臨界值將視個別銀行與管制者目標而異。如追求成本極小化的目標，管制者要求的臨界值會大於一，並為銀行資產組合風險之遞增函數，惟與存款保險費率之關係並不確定。當管制者追求社會福利極大化時，此臨界值則為銀行資產組合風險 與稽查成本之邊際效益的遞減函數，且為存款保險費率之遞增函數。另外，若存款保險費率小於一為稽查成本邊際效益之遞增函數的保費上限，追求社會福利極大化之管制者所要求的 臨界值將小於一。
• 中文關鍵字： cost-minimizing, welfare-maximizing , flat-rate deposit insurance, bank closure policy
• 英文關鍵字： 成本極小化，社會福利極大化，固定存款保險費率，銀行重組策略